In this paper, we analyse the signcryption scheme proposed by Libert and Quisquater in 2004 and show that their scheme does not meet the requirements as claimed in their paper in PKC'2004, such as, semantically secure against adaptive chosen ciphtertext attack, ciphertext anonymity and key invisibility.
Introduction
The concept of a signcryption scheme is proposed by Zheng in 1997 [5] . Since then, there are many signcryption schemes proposed. It is only recently that a formal security proof model [1] is formalized providing security proof for Zheng's scheme [5] in the random oracle model. In 2003, Boyen [3] proposed a secured identity-based signcryption scheme with ciphertext anonymity and provable secure in the random oracle model. Their security proof model is slightly different from that of [1] which includes the ciphertext anonymity. In 2004, Libert and Quisquater [4] modified Boyen's security proof model to non-identity based signcryption scheme and proposed a signcryption scheme. They proved that their signcryption scheme is secure in the random oracle model with the following properties: semantically security against adaptive chosen ciphertext attacks, ciphertext anonymity and key invisibility. In this paper, we show that none of the above properties are achieved under their defined attacks games.
Libert-Quisquater Signcryption Scheme
A signcryption scheme normally involves three stages, that is, key generation, signcryption generation and unsigncryption. Now, we describe the Libert-Quisquater signcryption scheme [4] as follows:
Key Generation: Let q be a prime number and G 1 and G 2 be groups of the same prime order q. Let P be a generator of G 1 and e be a bilinear map such that e :
Consider a user u, first chooses a random x u , ∈ Z q and computes X u = x u P. Then, the public key of a user u is X u and the private key is x u . We denote the sender and the receiver by s and r respectively and their private and public key pairs 
n+l , where n and l are some positive integer.
Signcrypt:
To signcrypt a message m ∈ {0, 1} n for the intended user r, the sender s first chooses a random w ∈ Z q and computes
Then, the ciphertext is C = (U, W, Z).
and check e(X s , H) = e(P, V). If the above condition does not hold, then reject the ciphertext.
Analysis
In this section, we describe the attack games in the security proof of the semantically secure against chosen ciphertext attacks, ciphertext anonymity and key invisibility which were defined in [4] . Although the authors proved all of three properties in the random oracle model, we show that none of them is achieved based on these attack games listed in [4] . Now, we describe these three attacks games as follows:
Definition 1 [4] (Semantically Security Against Chosen Ciphertext Attacks):
A signcryption scheme is semantically secure against chosen ciphertext attacks if no probabilistic polynomial time adversaries have a non-negligible advantage in the following game: 1. The challenger runs the key generation algorithm to generate a private/public key pair (sk * r , pk * r ) and gives pk * r to the adversary A.
2.
A submits a number of queries to the signcryption and unsigncryption. In signcryption queries, A chooses a message m ∈ M and an arbitrary public key pk r and sends them to the challenger. The challenger runs the signcrypt oracle Signcrypt(m, sk * r , pk r ) and returns the result. In unsigncryption queries, A submits a ciphertext C to the challenger. The challenger runs the unsigncrypt oracle Unsigncrypt(C, sk * r ). If the obtained signed-plaintext is valid for the recovered sender's public key, then returns the plaintext, otherwise returns the symbol ⊥. 
Definition 2 [4] (Ciphertext Anonymity or Key Privacy):
A signcryption scheme satisfies the ciphertext anonymity property if no probabilistic polynomial time distinguishers have a non-negligible advantage in the following game: 1. The challenger generates two keys (sk r,0 , pk r,0 ) and (sk r,1 , pk r,1 ), and gives pk r,0 and pk r,1 to the distinguisher D.
D adaptively makes a number of queries of signcryption
Signcrypt(m, sk r,c , pk r ) for arbitrary recipient key pk r and unsigncryption Unsigncrypt(C, sk r,c ) for c = 0 or c = 1. Based on the above attack games for proving the security, we show that none of the above properties is achieved in the following three claims:
Claim 1: The Libert-Quisquater signcryption scheme is not semantically secure against chosen ciphertext attack.
Proof: Assume that given the receiver's public key X r and the challenge ciphertext is C * = (U * , W * , Z * ) with the sender's secret key x s and a message m b which is one of m 0 , m 1 (generated by the adversary A), the adversary A
Then, one of m * i must be equal to m b , say m * b for some b ∈ {0, 1}. Hence the adversary A will make a correct guess b which is equal to b. Therefore, we conclude that the Libert-Quisquater signcryption scheme is not semantically secure against chosen ciphertext attacks. Claim 2: The Libert-Quisquater signcryption scheme does not provide ciphertext anonymity.
Proof: Given the receiver's public key X r,0 and X r,1 , the distinguisher D generates the sender's secret key x s,0 and x s,1 and a message m * ; and sends to the challenger. The challenger first chooses two randoms b, b ∈ {0, 1} for the target sender's secret key (x s,b ) and the target receiver's public key (X r,b ) respectively and produces the challenge ciphertext Proof: Given the receiver's public key X r , the distinguisher D generates the sender's secret key x s and a message m * ; and sends to the challenger to produce the challenge ciphertext C * = (U * , W * , Z * ). Upon receipt of the challenge ciphertext, the distinguisher D computes V t = x s H 1 (m * , U * , X r ) and (m t X t ) = Z * ⊕ H 3 (V t ). If m t = m * and X t = X s , then the distinguisher D outputs the guess b = 0, otherwise outputs b = 1. Hence, we conclude that the Libert-Quisquater signcryption scheme does not provide key invisibility.
Conclusion
In this paper, we showed that the Libert-Quisquater signcryption scheme does not fulfill the claim as stated in the paper [4] , that is, semantically security against chosen ciphertext attack, ciphertext anonymity and key invisibility. We demonstrate the attack methods for all the three properties and conclude that the Libert-Quisquater signcryption scheme is insecure in their attack games.
